Governments influence the price and quality of transport services, both through their investments in transport infrastructure and through a range of regulations. In rural areas these decisions affect the spatial pattern of agricultural production, with consequences for the efficiency of agriculture, the well-being of agriculturalists, and the revenues obtained from the agricultural sector by the government.
Governments influence the price and quality of transport services, both through their investments in transport infrastructure and through a range of regulations. In rural areas these decisions affect the spatial pattern of agricultural production, with consequences for the efficiency of agriculture, the well-being of agriculturalists, and the revenues obtained from the agricultural sector by the government.
In many African countries decisions on the pricing of transport services are made implicitly as a consequence of government interventions in the marketing of agricultural produce. Often these governments establish public or semipublic agencies (parastatals) with monopsony control over the marketing of export crops. The ways in which these parastatals pay farmers at different locations for their crops are equivalent to a set of regulations on the pricing and quality of transport services. One commonly adopted component of parastatal policy is panterritorial pricing, in which all farmers are paid the same price regardless of where their p'd&ce is purchased. This is the practice of the Compagnie Ivoirienne pour le Developpement des Textiles (CIDT) , the parastatal that is involved with cotton production and marketing in C6te d'lvoire. The case of the CIDT illustrates some of the policies on rural transport in Africa.
This article sets out some practical diagnostic tests of the efficiency of (implicit) transport policies embodied in state marketing and discusses the implications of the policies for infrastructural investment. These tests are feasible using readily available data for many African countries and crops. Section I presents a conceptual framework for looking at rural transport and state marketing, by building on the work of Walters (1968) on the Ellet model. Gersovitz (1989) applies the Ellet model to some topics in optimal taxation and agricultural marketing. Then these models are used to organize some basic facts about the operations of the CIDT. Section II models the implications of panterritorial pricing for transport policy and applies the model to the activities of the CIDT. Section III gives special attention to choices about the location of purchasing depots used by parastatals and the consequences for the implicit price of transport. In principle there are a wide variety of options here, and the CIDT exemplifies only one possibility. The final section makes some concluding remarks.
I. THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF PRODUCTION AND MARKETING IN THE EXPORT SECTOR
To understand the demand for rural transport generated by the production of a crop, one must understand where the crop is produced relative to where it is consumed or exported. The essence of agricultural production is, of course, the importance of land as an input and the consequent spatial dispersion of production. The volume and location of production are determined both by the area where the crop is cultivated (the extensive margin of cultivation) and by the intensity of production on land that is used to produce the crop (the intensive margin of cultivation). The boundaries of the region in which a particular crop is grown in a particular country may be determined in various ways: by the limits of the country's borders, by the limits of the land that is at all physically suitable for cultivation of the crop, or by the limits of the land on which it is economically profitable to grow the crop. The first two factors are exogenous to the transport policies of the government, whereas the last is highly influenced by them.
In practice whether one emphasizes changes in the intensive or extensive margins of cultivation in agricultural response to transport policy depends partially on the degree of aggregation in the information that is available. For individual farms, it may be possible to see changes in the extensive margin, whereas at a more aggregate level the boundaries of the region where production occurs may not change at all. In Africa information on the effect of transport policy on the agricultural response of individual farms is largely unavailable, either because governments do not collect it or because they treat it as confidential.
For practical reasons, therefore, the study of rural transport is largely restricted to data reported at a geographical level just below that of the region in which production occurs or to special studies of particular road projects. For the CIDT the data come from the geographical level termed zones productrices. Information on the CIDT is from Beenhakker and Bruzelius (1985) ; DCGT (1986, 1988) ; and CIDT (various years a, b, c).
The cotton sector of C6te d'Ivoire occupies about 188,000 square kilometers, split into about 56 zones that the CIDT uses for organizational and reporting purposes (map 1). It is bordered on the east, west, and north by the international boundaries of the country. To the south it is limited by the replacement of the savanna, which is agroclimatically suited to cotton, by the forest, which is not. It does not, therefore, seem that an important part of the response of production to decreases in transport costs would come from an expansion in the borders of the cotton region, as would be reflected in an addition of zones. Consequently, I assume that the number of zones is fixed when calculating the effects of changes in the (implicit) price of transport on production, on the benefits received by agricultural producers, and on government revenues.
It is possible, however, that the region of production could contract from its current boundaries, with zones dropping out of production entirely, if the effect of a change in policy on farmers is sufficiently adverse. The constant-elasticityof-supply function of the simulations implies that a zone does not drop out as long as its zonal price is positive. If the number of zones were to change with changes in the parameters of the model, then it would be necessary to keep track of which zones are in production at any given time and to alter the summation signs in the following equations correspondingly.
Calculation of the effects of transport policy requires a calculation of the benefits received by agricultural producers and the revenues received by the government. The first step is a calculation of the level of production. For the ith zone, production (Qi) is given by
where S(*) is a function that depends positively on the price (pi) received by farmers in the zone for their production and p2 is the initial (base case) price received by farmers for their output. When p, = p,) Qi = yi, so -yi is just the production of the zone at the initial price. The production response embodied in S( ) reflects the intensification of cultivation from adding inputs such as labor and fertilizer, bringing uncultivated land into cotton cultivation, and switching resources from the production of other crops. Government revenues from the production in a particular zone (Ri) are therefore
where p* is the export price of the output in world markets; c'-is the costs per ton paid by the parastatal that do not vary with the region of production; a* is the cost of transport per ton per kilometer paid by the parastatal; and t, is the 
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average distance from the zone to the port of export. The benefits to producers in a zone are measured by their producer surplus (Hi):
The corresponding total values for the sector as a whole are simply N (4)
where N is the number of zones (56 for All calculations are in terms of ginned cotton fiber. One kilogram of seed cotton is about 0.419 kilogram of ginned cotton fiber. Therefore, because farmers produce seed cotton and sell it to the CIDT for processing at the ginneries, their output is measured in the modeling exercise as yi = 0.419 times their actual deliveries of seed cotton (column 1 of table 1). To adjust for differences in the weight of unginned and ginned cotton and for differences in the cost of transport at different stages, the following steps are used to calculate ti: divide the distance from the zone to the ginnery (column 2) by 0.419, multiply the distance from the ginnery to the port (column 3) by 0.026 and divide by 0.067 to account for the differences in costs per kilometer per ginned cotton equivalent from the depot to the ginnery and from the ginnery to the port (table 2), and add the results from the preceding two steps to get an (adjusted) ti. The value of a* is then equal to CFAFO.067 per kilogram-kilometer.
One very weak test for efficiency in the transport policy implicit in these prices is that the return to selling cotton on the world market net of unavoidable costs paid by the CIDT, such as ginning (but not including transport costs), is greater than the costs to move cotton from the zone to the port (p* -c* > a*t,).
Because it neglects the farmers' costs, the criterion could be met and production could still be socially undesirable. As the data in tables 1 and 2 show, this condition is easily met for all zones. The net return to selling cotton on the world market is CFAF350, while the largest value of the cost of transport from the zone to the port is CFAF76.3. Furthermore, with the government paying cFAF191 to c. Weighted average of the distances to each ginnery to which deliveries were made in 1988 from a given zone, weighted by the fraction of total deliveries from the zone going to that ginnery.
d. Distance the cotton from a particular zone travels after it has been ginned. In a first step, distance to the port from a particular ginnery is a weighted average of the distances from the ginnery to the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro, weighted by the share of each port in the shipments of the particular ginnery. In the second step, the distance of the zone to the port is then the weighted average of the distances from the ginneries to the ports defined in step 1 to which the zone ships, weighted as in the calculations for distance from zone to ginnery. The ginnery at Dianra was assigned the same port shares as the ginnery at Mankono, and the ginnery at Seguela was assumed to ship all its cotton to San Pedro.
e. From farmgate to port via the ginnery. Calculation is based on one kilogram of seed cotton being equivalent to 0.419 kilogram of ginned cotton. See also the discussion in the text.
f. The ratio of producer surplus under optimal pricing to that under panterritorial pricing for an elasticity of supply of 0.67 and an R as in table 3.
Source: CIDT (various years c) for deliveries; unpublished data provided by the Caisse Centrale in Abidjan for distance from zone to ginnery; and Michelin (1989) and DCGT (1986, p. 24) for data to calculate weighted distance from ginnery to port. For ratio of producers' surplus calculations from model, as discussed in text.
farmers regardless of the zone, the net return to selling cotton on the world market, taking into account the price received by farmers, is cFAF159; this exceeds the largest value of the cost of transport by CFAF82.7. Thus the government gains revenue from every single zone, although the revenue per kilogram is less from the more remote zones.
II. PANTERRITORIAL PRICING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
Relatively remote places of production have relatively higher costs of transport to the place of ultimate consumption or export. Governments that buy farm output at the same price everywhere charge farmers in remote areas nothing for these higher costs. They may be said to subsidize fully the differential transport cost between remote and near-in farmers. Production is more dispersed than is efficient. Farmers may incur some transport costs in getting their output to the place of purchase, a cost of more or less significance, depending on the location of the government's buying depots, an issue that is given more attention in the next section. In C6te d'Ivoire the CIDT maintains a very dense network of depots, purchasing cotton at every village (DCGT 1988) . The costs of transport to the farmer are therefore very small, no more than CFAF5 per kilogram in the mid-1980s (Beenhakker and Bruzelius 1985) .
What are the implications of panterritorial pricing for the well-being of farmers and for the revenues of governments? To assess the transport pricing policy embodied in panterritorial pricing requires the simulation of alternative transport policies using equations 1 to 5. This, in turn, requires an assumption about the functional form of the zonal supply function, S(p). There is no information available on the supply function for cotton in Cote d'Ivoire; indeed panterritorial pricing means there is no regional price variation with which to infer response, thus leaving only rather limited time series information. I therefore adopt the form (6) S(p) = pa which has a constant price elasticity of supply denoted by a, and I present a sensitivity analysis for various values of a. The export price is the international price. Nontransport costs are net of all taxes and of the price paid to farmers. All variables refer to one kilogram of ginned cotton. The price received by farmers is constant for all zones because the CIDT pursued panterritorial pricing in 1982/83.
Source: Beenhakker and Bruzelius (1985) , especially table 8.
Using the constant-elasticity-of-supply function, the CIDT'S implementation of panterritorial pricing (pi a constant, as given in table 2) is compared with the most desirable pricing scheme (set of pi's). This latter policy maximizes the wellbeing of farmers (H) subject to the constraint of raising an amount of revenue (RO) for the government equal to that raised under panterritorial pricing. The solution to this transport pricing problem is referred to as the optimal policy. Actually, a tax on land that varies with location is first best, because it does not induce any change in farmers' behavior and therefore dominates even the pricing policy that I term optimal. Such a tax is rarely used, however, and appears to require a degree of administrative capability that is not available.
For any zonal supply function, the optimal policy is found by substituting from equations 1 to 5 into (7) *
Z= I + I(R -RO)
where 4I is a Lagrange multiplier and then setting the derivatives of equation 7 with respect to the prices received by farmers to zero. The derivatives are:
where the elasticity of supply is
Equation 8 holds for each of the N zones, so there are N equations. Along with the revenue constraint that R = RO, these N equations determine the spatial pattern of zonal prices and the Lagrange multiplier or (shadow) cost of having to raise one additional unit of revenue measured in lost producer surplus, a. The shadow cost is the only variable that is not specific to a particular zone in the equation for that zone.
In the special case of a constant elasticity of supply, the spatial pattern of prices takes a very simple form and has an intuitive interpretation of an (implicit) optimal subsidy to transport. Newbery (1990) makes a similar point for the subsidization of inputs when output is taxed. As indicated by equation 8, when the supply function has a constant elasticity, the optimal policy is defined by a pair of constants, px and a., such that Source: Author's calculations based on data from CIDT (various years c), Michelin (1989) , DCGT (1986) , unpublished data provided by the Caisse Central in Abidjan, and Beenhakker and Bruzelius (1985) .
Note that px and ax differ from p* and a* by the same proportion, X, and it is easy to show that raising a positive amount of revenue, RO > 0, implies that Px < p*, that is, X < 1. Thus 1 -X is both the tax rate on the export of the product and the subsidy rate on transport relative to a situation in which farmers receive the full export price but pay the full cost of transport.
Once the government is raising some revenue, therefore, it is no longer optimal to pass the full cost of transport, a*, on to the farmer. If the elasticity of supply is constant, transport should be subsidized to the same degree that the export is taxed. In this particular case, the optimal solution has all farmers paying the same tax, 1 -X, as a proportion of their pretax farmgate price (pi = px-a*ti). All farmers reduce their production and producer surplus by the same proportion. Therefore the cost of transport must be subsidized so that the percentage tax on the farmgate price is constant regardless of the farmer's location. The linear equation 9c together with equations 9a and 9b does exactly this. I
The values of the variables from tables 1 and 2 and equations 1 to 5 as well as various assumptions about the elasticity of supply, a, in equation 6 yield values for revenues, R, and producer surplus, II, under panterritorial pricing as given in column 1 of table 3. In addition equations 9a to 9d yield the value of the tax rate, 1 -X, that produces the same revenue as under panterritorial pricing, as given in column 2 of table 3.2 With such a X, the value of the producer surplus can be calculated under optimal pricing. For instance, when the elasticity of supply is 0.67, the value of the producer surplus under optimal pricing is 1.0024 (12.02921/12.00070) times the value of the producer surplus under panterritorial pricing (columns 1 and 2 in table 3). When the elasticity of supply is 1.33, which is probably a high value, the corresponding ratio of producer surpluses is 1.0294. Thus, whether the CIDT pursues an optimal policy or one of panterritorial pricing makes relatively little difference to the value of the aggregate producer surplus. Panterritorial pricing is, however, relatively less desirable the more elastic the supply is, that is, the more producers have scope for changing the volume of their output in response to the deviation between panterritorial pricing and the optimal spatial pattern of prices.
In contrast to these results on overall efficiency, switching from a policy of panterritorial pricing to an optimal one has a big effect on the distribution of 1. If the supply function does not exhibit a constant elasticity, then the relationship between the optimal p, and t, is nonlinear and could even embody an implicit tax, rather than a subsidy, on transport (see Gersovitz 1989 for a detailed, theoretical discussion of this issue). However, the prospects are slim for econometrically detecting a supply function that deviates significantly from constant elasticity with available data, so, in practice, the question is moot.
2. The value of X is found by solving numerically the (nonlinear) equation:
where, for each block of tables 3 and 4, RO is the value of R in column 1. Source: Author's calculations based on data from CIDT (various years c), Michelin (1989) , DCGT (1986) , unpublished data provided by the Caisse Central in Abidjan, and Beenhakker and Bruzelius (1985) .
producer surplus among zones. Column 5 in table 1 gives the ratio of the producer surplus under optimal pricing to that under panterritorial pricing by zone for an elasticity of supply of 0.67. With optimal pricing, the most remote zone, number 25, receives only 0.78 of the producer surplus it received under panterritorial pricing, whereas the nearest-in zone, number 51, receives 1.11 times as much. The coefficient of variation of the proportional gain is 8.2 percent.
I do not, however, know how these changes in zonal producer surpluses would translate into changes in the distribution of farmers' incomes, which is the important welfare issue. It all depends on who owns what land and how much of it. For instance, if all farmers owned an equal share in land everywhere, a change in the distribution of producer surplus among the zones would not affect the relative well-being of different farmers. In Africa, of course, the expectation is that small farmers depend entirely on agricultural land in one vicinity, so changes in the distribution of producer surplus at the zonal level would affect different farmers differently.
The dependence of farmers on land in one area raises further questions: Do farmers in more remote regions have more or better land-or other sources of income-so they are at least as well off as farmers nearer in? In the CIDT zones it would not be surprising if cotton were important in the incomes of these farmers and if poorer farmers lived in more remote areas. If this is so, the distribution of income could become considerably more dispersed by adopting an optimal pricing policy, while the gains in the aggregate producer surplus would be small. If farmers' incomes are tied to land within zones rather than widely diversified across zones, considerable redistribution relative to the net gain would have to be engineered among farmers in different zones-and in a nondistorting way. Otherwise the movement from panterritorial pricing to optimal pricing would not be a (pareto) improvement that makes no farmer worse off.
If, by contrast, the CIDT were raising more revenue than it currently does (as estimated in table 3), the situation would be somewhat different with respect to efficiency. For instance the price paid to farmers (pO) that maximizes the government revenue that can be raised under panterritorial pricing is given by:
(10)
as can be derived by setting the derivative of aggregate revenues, equation 4, to zero. Columns 1 and 2 in table 4 give the results of the model when the government maximizes the amount of revenue that it can raise under panterritorial pricing, with transport costs of CFAFO.067 per kilogram-kilometer. For an elasticity of supply of 0.67 the revenue-maximizing value of the panterritorial price is CFAF127 (table 4, column 1) or only 0.36 times the world price net of costs that are independent of zonal location (CFAF350 from table 2). In this case an equal amount of revenue can be raised with an optimal pricing policy that has X = 0.418 in equations 9a to 9c and a level of producer surplus 1.065 (6.49666 /6.10097) times that obtained with panterritorial pricing-a moderate difference. If the elasticity of supply is 1.33, the ratio of producer surplus under optimal pricing to that under panterritorial pricing is 1.092. Movement from the current situation (table 3, column 1) to revenue maximization (table 4, column 1) brings a small increase in revenue (about CFAF54 million) but a large decrease in producer surplus (about CFAF930 million). There is almost a 10 percent potential gain (about CFAF699 million) in producer surplus in moving from panterritorial pricing to optimal pricing (table 4, columns 1 and 2). In general, as the government raises more revenue, the deadweight loss of panterritorial pricing rises relative to that occurring under the optimal policy. Furthermore it is simply impossible to raise more revenue than that given in column 1 of table 4 if the constraint of panterritorial pricing is maintained, although with an optimal policy it would be possible to raise more if desired.
In C6te d'Ivoire cotton is produced in a geographically compact area with good transport compared with many other export hinterlands in Africa, yet the government's choice of an (implicit) transport pricing policy can affect producer surplus. For it to matter significantly, however, the government would have to be raising more revenue than seems to have been its practice as estimated in table 3. For example, in table 4, columns 1 and 2, more revenue is raised than in table 3, and when a = 1.33 distortions are estimated to be moderately large. By contrast, if the hinterland were more dispersed or if transportation per kilometer were more expensive, the costs of panterritorial pricing relative to optimal pricing would be higher. In simulations corresponding to those reported in tables 3 and 4, the cost of transport, a*, was doubled to 0.134. Even for this value, net returns to exporting cotton were greater than the cost of transport for all zones (p * -c* > a*ti). The result, corresponding to table 4, columns 1 and 2, for a = 1.33 but for a* = 0.134 was a producer surplus ratio of 1.21 in favor of optimal pricing as opposed to the much lower factor of 1.092 reported in table 4 fora* = 0.067. Tables 3 and 4 provide information to assess the benefits from investments in transport infrastructure as represented by a decrease in the cost per kilogramkilometer, a*. Revenue amounts shown in columns 4 and 5 of table 3 are the same as in columns 1 and 2, respectively, but transport costs are only half as much, and the same is true in table 4, when columns 3 and 4 are compared with columns 1 and 2, respectively. 3 The values in table 3 show that the gains in 3. Column 4 of table 3 is derived by finding numerically the p, that solves the (nonlinear) equation:
where p 0 is the value of p in column 1. Column 5 is determined from column 4 in the same way that column 2 is determined from column 1 (see footnote 2). The same procedure is followed to compute columns 3 and 4 of table 4.
producer surplus from a transport improvement under panterritorial pricing are larger than under optimal pricing. 4 Nonetheless the magnitude of the differences is small. For a = 1.33, the most extreme case in table 3, the gain under panterritorial pricing is CFAF6.12 billion, compared with CFAF5.89 billion under optimal pricing. These results carry over qualitatively to table 4, although raising more revenue accentuates the difference between the gains under the two pricing rules. For an elasticity of 1.33 the gain from halving transport costs under panterritorial pricing is CFAF6.94 billion; it is CFAF6.26 billion under optimal pricing. In this hypothetical example, whether a change in pricing policy is adopted may well determine whether an infrastructural investment is justified.
Investment in transport under panterritorial pricing yields greater benefits than under optimal pricing, because production is more dispersed under panterritorial pricing. Decisions about transport investments and pricing are interdependent. Of course the producer surplus is still highest under optimal pricing for a given level of infrastructure. Panterritorial pricing should not be adopted only to get higher apparent gains from transport investments. Rather, the analysis indicates that a move from panterritorial pricing to optimal pricing, if feasible, is an alternative way to realize some of the gains from a transport investment under panterritorial pricing without the corresponding costs. Thus the change in pricing may obviate the need for investment in transport.
The discussion comparing panterritorial pricing and optimal pricing generalizes easily to any other pricing scheme. For instance an export tax (at rate r) with private (full-cost) transportation would imply that the price received by farmers is given by
Such a scheme has superficial appeal because it may be thought to embody a user charge for transport, which is desirable in many other situations. From equations 9a to 9d, however, such a scheme is suboptimal if the government is raising some revenue (R > 0, X > 0, and r < 1), as in the case of cotton in C6te d'Ivoire. As noted, the reason is that charging the full cost of transport means that a tax at the port results in higher percentage taxation of the farmgate price as distance rises.
The results of full-cost pricing of transportation are illustrated in columns 3 and 6 of table 3.5 In terms of producer surplus, full-cost pricing of transport is better than panterritorial pricing, generally making up about 60 percent of the 4. That is, the difference in II between columns 1 and 4 is larger than the difference in II between columns 2 and S.
S. The effect on the producer surplus associated with a given government revenue can be found by solving for the value of r that produces a revenue equal to RI) from equations 1, 2, and 4 and then substituting the consequent set of pi into equations 3 and 5.
gap between panterritorial pricing and optimal pricing. Moving from panterritorial pricing to full-cost pricing causes a larger dispersion of zonal gains and losses than does moving from panterritorial to optimal pricing. For the parameters of the example given in table 1, column 5, the summary statistics for the ratio of producer surplus under full-cost pricing to that under panterritorial pricing are: mean, 0.98; standard deviation, 0.12; minimum, 0.64; and maximum, 1.18. Finally, because full-cost pricing results in less dispersed production, it makes investment in transportation infrastructure less attractive than does either alternative (compare columns 1 to 3 with columns 4 to 6 of table 3).
III. THE DENSITY OF DEPOTS AND BACKHAULING
Farm outputs are often gathered at depots before transport to processing plants or to the point of export. The number and location of these depots can have significant economic effects. One important attribute of a depot system is the extent of backhauling that it engenders. Here I bend the conventional definition of backhauling to mean the movement by farmers of their output away from the point of processing, export, or ultimate consumption. Backhauling can increase the transport costs of the sector unnecessarily.
Not all marketing systems engender backhauling. For instance, if depots exist in every village and the marketing authority adopts panterritorial pricing, then a farmer gets the same price for output no matter where it is sold. Therefore the farmer sells the output at the nearest depot, which is very close to where the crop is harvested, and there is (almost) no backhauling. This situation prevails in C6te d'Ivoire, where the CIDT operates one depot in each cotton-growing village in the sector.
Another situation in which there need not be an incentive to backhaul occurs if the marketing parastatal equates the price at any depot to the price received at the final point of sale less the full cost of transport to that point. If, in addition, the private sector has the same (or lower) costs of transport to the depot, it never pays to send produce away from the destination to which the parastatal wants it to go. The depots nearer the ultimate destination pay a sufficiently higher price so that farmers send their output to those depots even if they are farther away than other depots.
The preceding section of this article, however, establishes that full-cost pricing of transport is not optimal if the government is raising revenue from the sector. In particular, when the elasticity of supply is constant, equations 9a to 9d show that the optimal spatial pattern of prices embodies a subsidy to transport. In this case it is as if the private sector has more costly transport than the parastatal. It may become privately profitable to move output to a depot that is nearer to the farm but farther from the destination to which output is being moved by the parastatal. Backhauling then occurs. Although depots nearer to the parastatal's ultimate destination pay higher prices, they are insufficiently higher to guarantee that it is never profitable to ship to depots that are farther from the ultimate destination but very much nearer to the farmer.
If there are very many depots, then the amount of backhauling is unimportant, because the depot that is farther from the ultimate destination but nearer to the farmer and the depot that is farther from the farmer but nearer to the ultimate destination are both absolutely very near the farmer. If depots are expensive to set up, however, there will be of necessity few of them, and then backhauling can be a problem. Backhauling increases the deadweight loss from raising a given amount of revenue and lowers the maximum amount of revenue that the government can raise (Gersovitz 1989) .
Panterritorial pricing can further worsen the problem of backhauling when there are few depots because, by equalizing all depot prices, it gives no incentive for farmers to sell to depots nearer the ultimate destination instead of the depot that is nearest to the farmer. How serious the backhauling problem is depends not just on the number of depots but on their location, so little of generality can be said. Nonetheless some examples suggest what to look for and what to expect from different schemes that may be met in practice.
If there are few depots all with the same producer price, but all are clustered near the ultimate destination, then backhauling is likely to be a small problem. For example, the government may adopt the principle of paying only one price but, in practice, buy output only at the ultimate destination. Thus the pricing scheme is one of full-cost pricing of transport because, although the parastatal pays only one price, it pays this price at only the ultimate location. In this case a second depot, paying the same price as the first and located (optimally) quite near it, can decrease the deadweight loss despite inducing some backhauling. This occurs because, as noted, full-cost pricing of transport is not optimal. A second depot located near the first and paying the same price mimics the transport subsidy implicit in equations 9a to 9d that minimizes deadweight loss and at the same time engenders little backhauling. The net gain from the extra depot is, however, relatively small. 6 By contrast, when the placing of depots is constrained and there are few of them relative to the distance to the ultimate destination, severe losses can occur from backhauling. For instance, if production occurs at one ton per kilometer along a road of length D (as measured from the ultimate destination), then, with only one depot at the ultimate destination, the total ton-kilometers to transport the whole crop to the ultimate destination is proportional to D 2 /2. By contrast, if a second depot, paying the same price, is located D from the ultimate destination (the absolutely worst place for it along the road), then all output of amount D/2 produced along the road from point D/2 to D is nearer to the second depot and is brought there (D 2 1/8 ton-kilometers in total). 7 This output of amount D/2 produced from D/2 to D then has to be brought back a distance of D to the ultimate destination (D 2 /2 ton-kilometers). Total transport costs are proportional to 3D 2 /4, including the (D 2 /8) ton-kilometers generated by the production between point D/2 and the ultimate destination at point 0. Transport costs rise by 50 percent compared with purchase at only the ultimate destination. Thus a combination of panterritorial pricing, few depots, and bad locations can induce large excess transport costs. In general, if production is uniformly distributed along a road with many (n) depots, each collecting output from a radius of r, the amount of backhauling is proportional to nr 2 , providing a rough guide to the extent of backhauling.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article provides diagnostic tests for analyzing the transport policies that are explicitly or implicitly pursued through state marketing in Africa. A central result of the analysis is the interrelationship among rules for the taxation of exports, the pricing of transport, and investment in transport. The models are fairly general and can be applied to readily available data.
If the government uses an export tax to raise revenue, it may be optimal to subsidize transport to lessen the loss in total producer surplus from raising a specified amount of revenue. In the particular case of a supply function with constant elasticity, transport should be subsidized at the same rate as the export is taxed. This result has direct relevance to the debate on the pricing of diesel fuel and kerosene. The usual presumption is that, while it is desirable to subsidize kerosene because the poor use it as a cooking fuel, such a subsidy would result in unacceptable distortions because kerosene can be substituted for diesel as fuel in the transport sector (Newbery and others 1988) . This article suggests that some subsidization of transport may be desirable, thus moderating the conflict between kerosene and diesel pricing policies.
The optimal policy can be contrasted with two suboptimal policies: panterritorial pricing and full-cost pricing of transport with export taxation. For cotton in C6te d'Ivoire, the cost of the current policy of panterritorial pricing does not seem to be large relative to the optimal policy. Full-cost pricing closes a little more than half the gap between panterritorial pricing and optimal pricing. Elsewhere in Africa, however, the agricultural hinterland is much larger, production more dispersed, and the gains from moving to optimal pricing are likely to be correspondingly larger. Furthermore, if the network of depots at which output is bought is badly designed, it can lead to large losses, especially when 7. As in footnote 6, the model of equations 21 and 22 of section VI of Gersovitz (1989) can be used to prove this statement by imposing the additional constraint that po = p 1 and looking at arbitrary values of XD and the common value of po and p 1 . panterritorial pricing is adopted. Such is not the case in C6te d'Ivoire, if the current dense network of depots is not costly to operate and maintain. Nonetheless, if the government of Cote d'Ivoire were ever to seek more revenue from the cotton sector, the losses from staying with panterritorial pricing would increase. The conclusions on the harmful effects of panterritorial pricing depend critically on how much revenue the government raises from the agricultural sector.
